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Democracy, Inequality and Economic 
Development: The Case of Pakistan 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we made an attempt to understand the costs and benefits of democracy for economic growth 
in Pakistan by analyzing the relationship between democracy and its various measures.  Using instrumental 
variables and RALS (rth-order autoregressive least squares) estimation techniques, it is shown that during 
the period 1972-2005, there is only a tenuous and uncertain relationship between democracy and fiscal 
policy variables like expenditures, revenues and deficit; whereas democracy has no impact at all on the 
income inequality. Moreover, we observed that the political rights had a significant negative impact on 
fiscal expenditures, suggesting that with an increase in political rights, the governing institutes begin to feel 
themselves more accountable and as such are more circumspect in expenditures.    
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1. Introduction 
Democracy as a political system in Pakistan has been an elusive goal since 1947. The 
year 2007 has seen one of the most intense and vociferous displays of the demands for 
the restoration of democracy in Pakistan‟s history, and as such has attained a special 
significance in the context of the struggle for democratic ideals. The rights groups, 
politician and opinion makers at all levels seem to sell the idea of democracy as a 
panacea for all the ills of the nation. It is often claimed that continuous administration of 
“larger” doses of democracy will strengthen the institutions and help realize the ideal of 
fairness and justice in the society. However, the question between the lines is that “Does 
this sound and fury have an economic logic?” 
The focus of the existing studies on the relationship between economic growth, income 
inequality and democracy can be classified into two directions. First, they examined the 
impact of certain existing levels of “collective wellbeing” and “education” in a given 
time on the process of democratization. Second, they studied the impact of adoption of 
democratic institutions on the economy of the country.  
Historically, the correlation between democracy and income inequality has been a subject 
to which social sciences have given singular attention, and has achieved an added interest 
in recent times against the background of intense demands for democratic rights in many 
parts of the world. The conventional wisdom suggests that smoothing the angularities in 
the distribution of political power leads to a more equitable distribution of income. 
Aristotle way back in (1111) held that in democratic systems “the poor have more 
sovereign power than the men of property, for they are more numerous and the decisions 
of the majority prevail.‟‟ 
However, in recent times, a lot of effort is being spent on exploring the effect of the 
democratization process on the growth of national economy. For example, Roll and 
Talbott (2001) interpret democracy as an “information mechanism” which enables the 
rulers to get a feedback from the electorate about the success or otherwise of different 
economic policies which they have pursued during the period of their incumbency. 
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Similarly, the study by Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) developed a channel through which 
democracy affects economic growth. They has traced a definite link between the level of 
democracy and the accumulation of human capital and the distribution of income, the 
latter two being considered important factors for economic growth.  
Democracy is ascribed the virtue of changing the political power structure along the lines 
which are conducive for bringing about egalitarian changes in the society.  Democracy is 
also known to tone down the inequalities left in the wake of autocratic governments
1
.  
Recording empirical evidence, although a massive amount of research has focused on the 
interaction between democracy and growth, it is difficult to establish definitively whether 
democracy has a positive or negative effect on growth. This difficulty derives partly from 
the fact that democratic dispensations at times generate diverging effects on the factors 
on which economic activity largely depends. Thus democratic system, believed to lower 
the rate of physical capital investment, is also considered as notoriously susceptible to the 
arm-twisting of various lobby groups. Similarly, as said by Portar et al (1998), 
democratic system, though known to reduce political instability, is also considered 
responsible for a skewed income distribution.  
Theoretically, the relationship between democracy and income inequality has been 
established in the median-voter models of Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina et al. 
(1992), who taking a cue from Meltzer and Richard (1981), suggest that democracies 
generate redistribution policies based on the median-voter‟s income. In autocracies, on 
the other hand, the rulers are by no means constrained to meet the public demands for 
redistributive policies. Thus, following the well-known existing literature, we examine 
the dynamic influence of democracy on income inequality, economic development and 
the people well-being in Pakistan
2
.   
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the literature review. 
Section 3 provides a brief description of the econometric methodology and data. Section 
                                                 
1
 For more details on this subject, see Lenski (1966) and Bollen and Jackman (1985).  
2
 According to our knowledge best no systematic research has been undertaken in Pakistan regarding the 
impact of democracy on economic growth, distribution of resources and fiscal policy etc. 
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4 presents the empirical results, while in section 5, some concluding remarks are 
provided.    
2. Literature Review 
Lipset (1959) stated that in democracies, elections serve as a vehicle for enabling the 
electorate to vote for the proponents of working class interests. He said that over the past 
one hundred years, political lines are so drawn that the political parties have started 
showing leftist tendencies with the explicit aim of reducing inequalities. He assumed that 
in the countries where a certain level of “collective wellbeing” exists, the electorate will 
not favor excessively redistributive policies, and secondly, a certain level of education is 
a prerequisite for the prosperity of the country.  
Borner et al. (1995) point out a shift in the attitude towards democracy in the research 
literature in 1980, before which the discussion about compatibility between democracy 
and development was largely carried out in terms of a “cruel choice” between the two. 
Democracy was considered to single out consumption as a target of policy instead of 
investment (crucial for development in its own right), with the result that investment on 
physical capital could never reach such a level as to ensure economic growth in 
subsequent periods.  
The economic successes in the countries of Soviet bloc and South-East Asia as well as 
Chile in South America, all run by autocratic governments, led researchers like 
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) to establish a relation between “ideology and statistics” 
which explains the diversity in results in earlier literature. There is also evidence related 
to the growth-promoting and egalitarian tendencies of autocratic regimes in East Asia. 
The remarkable reduction in inequality in countries like Taiwan and South Korea under 
dictatorial regimes is a case in point (Gradstein and Milanovic (2000)). 
In an extreme case, the democracy has been found to be positively related to inequality, 
the reason of which may lie in the fact that despite the claims of democracy as catering to 
the demands of the public, democratic dispensations can rarely assuage the claims of the 
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poorer segments of society when they are faced with a vast range of competing claims 
(Beitz (1982)).  
In terms of the link between democracy, growth, inequality and fiscal policy (see Barro 
(2001)), democracy has been found out to be a major element for government size in 
various models, where the governments which are too unwieldy to be efficient 
correspond to non-democratic forms of governance. The reason is not difficult to assess 
because the autocracies tend to maximize the tax rate so that highest amount of resources 
could be earmarked for their private interests like “ostentatious consumption” and 
“military expenses” (see Olson (1991)). 
Efforts are underway recently to explain the apparent dichotomy in the effects of 
democracy on inequality. An inverse U-shaped relationship between democracy and 
inequality has been discovered. In fact, a unique historical experience in Europe, 
especially in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Sweden has informed most of 
the discussion about the interaction of democracy and inequality in Kuznet‟s curve 
framework. In these countries, enfranchisement was preceded by gross inequality, which 
in its part led to social conflicts and tussles. Democratization process ensued only through 
redistribution and education. These historical undercurrents have been captured in the 
models of Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) and Acemoglu and Robinson (1998a, 2002). 
Acemoglu and Robinson (1998a) contend that the poor are unable to invest in human 
capital, when the few rich individuals accumulate resources following heavy investment 
in industrialization. This is precisely the discrepancy which leads to an intensified 
inequality. Once the poor sections of the society are pushed to the wall, they take 
desperate measures to break out of the vicious circle of deprivation. In the face of a 
threatening posture of the poor sections, where revolution begins to seem like a distinct 
reality, the power brokers are compelled to share the political powers with these sections 
with the result that there would be an increased redistribution and higher investment in 
human capital. Thus inequality will begin to subside.  
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A competing view of democracy being determined by inequality is presented by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) who argue that development is responsible for widening 
income disparities, and the increased income disparity in its turn leads towards political 
violence and instability. In such a situation there is a heightened pressure on jittery 
political elite for decentralization in the political power. The democratization thus 
achieved encourages institutional reforms which lead to a decrease in inequality.  
However, the impact of institutional reforms is not invariably positive for the economy in 
terms of the income inequality. The institutional reforms may also result in greater 
income inequality. Certain informal sectors in the economy, especially of the developing 
countries, may have to bear the initial cost of institutional changes. As most of the 
members of the informal economy are already marginalized, a sharp decrease in the 
income may deepen the problem of income inequality (see Chong and Caldero (2000)).  
3. Variable Description, Sample Period and Econometric Modeling 
3.1. Fiscal Policy 
The Olson‟s hypothesis linking democracy and government size has been analyzed and 
government size has been measured with two variables: the size of overall public 
expenditures (EXP) and overall revenues (REV) both as a percentage of GDP. We also 
analyzed the size of social expenditure that helps implement redistributive policies in the 
framework of median voter models. Therefore we used the expenditure of the 
government on community, social and public services (CSPS) as a ratio of GDP. We also 
investigated central government‟s budget deficit (DEF), which merits high attention in 
any fiscal policy analysis. Budget deficit has important ramifications for a level of 
democracy.  
We obtained the data for EXP, REV, and DEF from International Financial Statistics 
database for the period from 1953-2001. Data for the period from 2002 to 2005 is taken 
from Handbook of Statistics on Pakistan Economy (HSPE) prepared by State Bank of 
Pakistan (SBP) and adjusted for small differences found in both the series because of 
different measurement techniques used by IFS and SBP. We first calculated the ratio of 
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the observations from IFS to HSPE for as many years as the data was available, and then 
took the average of this ratio variable and used it as a conversion factor for multiplying 
with HSPE values to calculate the last four data points for years 2002-2005. The source 
of CSPS is HSPE and data is available for the period 1950-2005.  
3.2. Inequality 
The second dependent variable is Gini coefficient which measures the degree of income 
concentration in the whole economy (GINI). We used Deninger and Squire (1996) 
dataset. However, the problem with this dataset is that the data for GINI is available only 
for the years 1964, 1966-72, 1979, 1985-92 and 1996. The GINI data for the years 1993 
is available in two published research papers namely Mahboob (2000) and Iqbal and 
Siddiqui (1998). The data for the year 2002 was available at WDI 2006. The data for the 
years 2001 and 2005 was available from the Economic Survey of Pakistan 2006-2007. 
For the missing years we took two data series “age dependency ratio (dependents to 
working-age population)” and “claims on private sector (annual growth as % of M2)” 
(WDI (2006)) which were found to have the highest correlation with the available GINI 
observations. Then GINI was regressed on these variables and the resulting OLS 
estimates were used for generating data for the missing years. For the years 2003 and 
2004, the simple average of GINI values in years 2001 and 2005 was used. The 
regression model was found to pass all the diagnostic tests (See the Appendix II).  
3.3. Independent Variables: Democracy 
Democracy is the independent variable in this study. The democracy – as defined by 
Schumpeter (1947) – is formally defined as a corpus of laws and procedures which 
regulate the transfer of political authority in conjunction with freedom of expression at all 
levels of public life. A competing view of democracy also takes in its purview civil 
liberties like freedom of speech and freedom of press (see Huntington (1993)).
3
  An 
analysis based on a formalist definition of democracy consisting only of constitutional 
                                                 
3 Huntington suggests that civil liberties are essential elements of an effective democracy.  
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rules and procedures gives results quite different from those which do not limit 
democracy to constitutional rules and procedures.
4
   
In this study, two different variables are used as a proxy for democracy.
5
 Polity, the first 
natural choice for the analysis of the issue which we are pursuing in this paper, is taken 
from POLITY IV Project data set by Marshall and Jaggers (2004) that contains data for 
all those countries where the population is above 500,000 individuals since 1800.  
Basically, the variable POLITY is computed by subtracting AUTOC score from the 
DEMOC score. The resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) 
to -10 (strongly autocratic). So this variable measures the degree of political activity, the 
openness of the executive authority to new candidates and the limitations imposed on the 
executive. The years 1969, 1970 and 1972 in Pakistani history have been assigned a score 
-88, and the year 1971 has been assigned a score of -77. The score -88 indicates a 
transition period in which new political paradigms are preceded by a transition period, the 
latter being guided by some executive authority or some other legislative measures.   
To avoid the negative scoring, we used the variable POLITY2 instead, which is a 
modified version of POLITY variable with the sole purpose of making the POLITY2 data 
series amenable for time-series analysis. It changes the combined annual POLITY score 
by applying a “fix”, a technique to convert the “standardized authority scores” (i.e. -88, -
77) to conventional polity scores between the range -10 to +10. The values have been 
converted according to the following rule set: -77, the score indicating “interregnum” or 
anarchy, is converted to a “neutral” Polity score of 0; whereas the score -88, indicating 
“transition” is prorated across the span of the transition. For example, if a country X has a 
Polity score of -7 in 1957, and the following three years have been assigned the score -88 
and the score in 1961 is +5, the change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening 
                                                 
4
 These differences, however, characterize all the empirical studies in which the categorical variable 
democracy is used for empirical analysis. For instance different notions of democracy lead to different 
results (see Persson T. and Tabellini G. (1994)). 
5
 The purpose of using the two different measures of democracy is to see if differences in the estimated 
effects of democracy arise from the different definition of it.  
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period of three years at a rate of per year, such that the converted scores are as follows: 
1957(-7), 1958(-4), 1959(-1), 1960(+2) and 1961(+5)
6
.   
The second variable used as a democracy index is GASTIL, which is average between 
two indicators of political rights (POL-RIGHTS) and civil liberties (CIV-LIB). The 
source of this variable is Freedom House, which has covered almost all countries of the 
world since 1972 through its Freedom in the World survey (see Helliwell (1994)). 
GASTIL differs from POLITY in the sense that POLITY is almost identical to the POL-
RIGHTS component of GASTIL, whereas the POLITY is totally unrelated to the other 
component of GASTIL, that is, CIV-LIB. 
3.4. Empirical Methodology 
Earlier literature on the relationship between democracy, growth and inequality has 
mainly depended on simple OLS regression analysis. However, the validity of the results 
from OLS regression analysis depends on the conditional independence of the regressors 
and even more importantly on the normality of errors. Hence the F, t and chi-squared 
statistics that we use are not reliable because they crucially depend on the assumption of 
normally distributed disturbances. If the assumption of the normality of errors is violated, 
then the exact distributions of these statistics depend on the data and do not follow F, t 
and chi-squared distribution (see Greene (2003)). 
In order to take into account these empirical issues such as “normality” and “direct 
reverse causation”, we apply the two other methods namely the Instrumental Variables 
(IV) and orderr th  Autoregressive Least Square (RALS) in this study. The RALS 
method in general form is defined as follows:  
  

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 For further details on this subject, see Marshals and Jaggers (2004).    
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when:  
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OLS estimates of {βi} are calculated before estimating by RALS, as are LM-test values 
of {αi}, where the autocorrelation order is `data frequency+1' (for example, 13 for 
monthly data). These estimates are again used to initialize θ. On convergence, the 
variances of the θs are calculated (from Q-1), as are the roots of α(L) = 07‟8.   
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Fiscal Policy 
The estimated results using IV method are presented in Table 1. It is interesting to note 
that the estimates of all the four variables namely CASTIL, POLITY2, PLO-RIGHTS 
CIVIL-LIB are negative. The coefficients of GASTIL and POL-RIGHTS are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the results provide evidence that the POLITY2 and 
CIVI-LIB appeared statistically insignificant.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 See Dooenik and Hendry (2006), for details.  
8
 Doornik, Jurgen A. And Hendry, David F., (2006) have formulated the above RALS estimation method in 
“Empirical Econometric Modelling, PcGive 11: Volume I”, London, Timberlake Consultants Ltd.  
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Table 1 
 Fiscal Policy, Instrumental Variables Results, 
Sample Period: 1972 to 2005 
(1) 
GASTIL 
(2) 
POLITY2 
(3) 
POL-RIGHTS 
(4) 
CIVIL-LIB 
(5) 
OBS 
(6) 
χ2 
(7) 
IVs 
(8) 
EXP -0.014 
(0.006)** 
   34 1.049 
[0.306] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
EXP  -0.001 
(0.000) 
  34 0.717 
[0.397] 
DEMOC 
PARCOMP 
EXP   -0.009 
(0.004)** 
 34 1.449 
[0.229] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
EXP    -0.095 
(0.102) 
34 0.449 
[0.503] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
REV -0.006 
(0.005) 
   34 2.167 
[0.141] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
REV  0.001 
(0.000) 
  34 2.037 
[0.154] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
REV   -0.003 
(0.003) 
 34 2.448 
[0.118] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
REV    -0.064 
(0.063) 
34 0.052 
[0.820] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
CSPS 0.004 
(0.002)** 
   34 0.855 
[0.355] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
CSPS  0.000 
(0.000)** 
  34 0.754 
[0.385] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
CSPS   0.002 
(0.001)** 
 34 1.344 
[0.246] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
CSPS    0.024 
(0.024) 
34 0.560 
[0.454] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
DEF 0.006 
(0.004) 
   34 1.590 
[0.207] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
DEF  
 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
1.629 
[0.202] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
DEF  
 
 
 
0.003 
(0.002) 
 
 
34 
 
2.049 
[0.152] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
DEF  
 
  0.052 
(0.060) 
34 
 
0.106 
[0.745] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
*, **, *** denote the significant at the 90%, 95% and 99% level. Standard Errors are given in 
parentheses; probabilities for the specification test-stat χ2 are given in square brackets9. 
                                                 
9
 The specification χ2 tests for the independence of the instruments (XRCOMP, DEMOC and PARCOMP), 
given in the column (8) of the Table 1, and their standard errors are given in column (7). However, the null 
of the independence of instruments from errors in all the democracy variables could not be rejected.  
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Using IVs estimation method, GASTIL, POLITY2 and POL-RIGHTS are found to be 
significantly and positively related to CSPS, whereas the civil liberties variable has a 
correct positive sign but is insignificant. However, a direct link between community, 
social and public services and democracy has been established beyond doubt but is 
tenuous in case of independent variable civil liberties. The specification test statistic 
probability in all the cases where CSPS is a dependent variable suggests that there is 
statistically no significant correlation between instruments used in the specification and 
the errors.  
As far as the relationship of democracy and its various measures with budget deficit is 
concerned, all the coefficients, except POLITY2, are positively related with budget 
deficit, but are insignificant. POLITY2 is negatively related with all the measures of 
democracy and is also significant. As mentioned above, there are two competing but 
plausible theories regarding the relationship between budget deficit and any measure of 
democracy. The autocratic governments may have low budget deficit because they have 
been ostracized from the international capital market because of not espousing the 
globally accepted democratic ideals, but the democratic governments may also have low 
budget deficits because they are compelled to maintain a budgetary discipline. Thus, it 
can be stated that the data rejects any significant relationship between democracy and two 
components of GASTIL in Pakistan.  
We now present the results from the RALS estimation method and see that the errors are 
not autocorrelated except in the case of the variable CSPS. The variable CSPS took a 
nosedive in the year 1981 which caused a big outlier leading to the non-normality of the 
data. However, when we introduced a dummy variable D1981 to pick the effects of a 
sudden fall in the CSPS, the errors were this time found to be normal. However, the 
errors could not pass the test for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation at 95%; it could 
not be rejected at 99%.  We also present the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) test, normality test, heteroskedasticity test and Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test in the Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Fiscal Policy, RALS Results, 
 Sample Period: 1972 to 2005 
 Gastil Polity2 
Pol- 
Rights 
Civ- 
Lib 
OBS 
Partial 
R
2
 
ARCH 
1-1 
Test F 
Normality 
Test 
Χ2 
Hetero 
Test 
F 
B-G
(A)
 
Auto. 
F 
EXPEN -0.007    33 0.083 0.359 1.221 0.219 3.66 
 (0.004)      [0.554] [0.543] [0.805] [0.07]* 
EXPEN  0.001   33 0.083 0.273 0.393 0.018 3.63 
  (0.001)     [0.605] [0.821] [0.982] [0.07]* 
EXPEN   -0.003  33 0.038 0.003 0.660 0.423 3.87 
   (0.003)    [0.956] [0.719] [0.659] [0.06]* 
EXPEN    0.008 33 0.084 0.482 0.330 0.844 1.04 
    (0.005)   [0.493] [0.848] [0.441] [0.32] 
REVEN 0.004    32 0.067 0.647 2.044 0.386 2.27 
 (0.003)      [0.429] [0.360] [0.683] [0.14] 
REVEN  0.000   32 0.000 1.381 3.817 2.677 2.54 
  (0.000)     [0.250] [0.148] [0.086]* [0.12] 
REVEN   0.001  32 0.022 0.169 1.032 0.968 3.79 
   (0.002)    [0.684] [0.597] [0.393] [0.06]* 
REVEN    0.003 32 0.021 0.130 0.215 1.071 2.89 
    (0.003)   [0.722] [0.898] [0.357] [0.10] 
CSPS 0.001    33 0.037 1.122 2.951 4.347 7.32 
 (0.001)      [0.299] [0.229] [0.013]** [0.01]** 
CSPS  0.000   33 0.044 1.027 3.424 3.444 7.20 
  (0.000)     [0.320] [0.181] [0.031]** [0.01]** 
CSPS   0.000  33 0.015 0.927 2.503 4.560 6.63 
   (0.001)    [0.344] [0.286] [0.011]** [0.02]** 
CSPS    0.000 33 0.001 0.936 2.245 3.635 8.04 
    (0.001)   [0.342] [0.326] [0.026]** [0.01]** 
DEF 0.002    33 0.008 1.011 0.368 0.168 0.22 
 (0.004)      [0.323] [0.832] [0.846] [0.64] 
DEF  -0.001   33 0.031 1.085 0.393 0.221 0.37 
  (0.000)     [0.306] [0.822] [0.803] [0.55] 
DEF   0.002  33 0.033 0.829 0.422 1.531 0.40 
   (0.002)    [0.370] [0.810] [0.234] [0.53] 
DEF    -0.002 33 0.005 1.197 0.425 0.174 0.44 
    (0.006)   [0.283] [0.809] [0.841] [0.51] 
  14 
*, **, *** denote significant at the 90%, 95% and the 99% level, respectively. Standard Errors are given in 
parentheses; probabilities for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity of errors test-stat F, the 
normality of errors test-stat χ2 and the heteroscedasticity of errors test-stat F are given in square brackets. 
(a)
  
is the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test. Probabilities are given in brackets. 
 
 
Table 2 shows that GASTIL is insignificantly and inversely related with expenditure thus 
confirming Olson‟s theory of inverse relationship between democracy and expenditure 
because the aim of an autocratic regime is to impose tax at a rate where it is possible for 
it to channel highest amount of resources towards displaying military might as well as 
expenditure on other ostentatious consumption. However, the other measures of 
democracy POLITY2, is positively but insignificantly related to expenditure thus 
contradicting Olson‟s theory of inverse relationship between democracy and expenditure. 
GASTIL and POLITY2 are however positively but insignificantly related to revenue thus 
contradicting the Olson‟s theory which provides that autocracies tend to maximize the tax 
rate so that highest amount of resources could be earmarked for their private interests like 
“ostentatious consumption” and “military expenses”10.   
The components of GASTIL, POL-RIGHT and CIV-LIB are related with expenditures 
and revenues positively but are insignificant. The extremely small magnitude of the 
explanatory variables shows that there is no discernable impact of democracy and its 
various measures and components on expenditures and revenues. GASTIL and POLITY2 
and two components of GASTIL, POL-RIGHT and CIV-LIB are related with CSPS 
positively and insignificantly. Again the magnitude is so small that no interesting relation 
is visible.    
Regarding the relationship of democracy and its various measures with budget deficit is 
concerned; GASTIL is insignificantly and positively related with deficit, whereas 
POLITY2 is negatively but insignificantly related to deficit. As mentioned above, there 
are two competing but plausible theories regarding the relationship between budget 
deficit and any measure of democracy. The autocratic governments may have low budget 
deficit because they have been ostracized from the international capital market because of 
                                                 
10
 See Olson (1991), for further details on this subject.  
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not espousing the globally accepted democratic ideals, but the democratic governments 
may also have low budget deficits because they are compelled to maintain a budgetary 
discipline. The data rejects any significant relationship between democracy and two 
components of GASTIL in Pakistan. POL-RIGHT and CIV-LIB has positive and 
negative relationship with budget deficit respectively. However, both POL-RIGHT and 
CIV-LIB are insignificant.  
Table 3 shows the IVs method results to analysis the impact of different measures of 
democracy on inequality. It can be observed from the table that both measures are 
significant at 90% level. GASTIL has a theoretically plausible negative sign, but 
POLITY2 has positive sign. The chi-squared probability shows that the both the 
instruments used in the specification, XRCOMP and DEMOC are uncorrelated with 
errors. But unlike GASTIL and POLITY2, POL-RIGHTS and CIVIL-LIB are 
insignificantly related with GINI. Both POL-RIGHTS and CIVIL-LIB have theoretically 
plausible negative sign. The IVs estimation method establishes a very tenuous 
relationship between democracy and GINI. However GASTIL and POL-RIGHT as well 
as CIV-LIB have correct negative sign in sync with the theory which provides that a 
higher level of democratization leads to lower level of income inequality (see Decarolis 
(2003)). By using the individual components of GASTIL, POL-RIGHT and CIV-LIB, we 
tried to find the specific institutional effects on democracy. However, both the 
components show no significant results. 
Table 3 
Instrumental Variables Results for Inequality, 
Sample Period: 1972 to 2005 
 
GASTIL POLITY2 
POL- 
RIGHTS 
CIVIL- 
LIB 
OBS χ2 IVs 
GINI -1.500 
(0.877)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
0.634 
[0.426] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
GINI  
 
0.148 
(0.085)* 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
0.63649  
[0.4250] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
GINI  
 
 
 
-0.898 
(0.545) 
 
 
34 
 
0.936 
[0.333] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
GINI  
 
 
 
 
 
-9.974 
(12.270) 
34 
 
0.334 
[0.563] 
XRCOMP 
DEMOC 
*, **, *** denote significant at the 90%, 95% and the 99% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 
 RALS Results for Inequality, 
Sample Period, 1972 to 2005 
 GASTIL POLITY2 
POL 
- 
RIGHTS 
CIV- 
LIB 
OBS 
Partial 
R
2
 
ARCH 
1-1 
test F 
Normality 
test 
χ2 
Hetero 
test 
F 
B-G
(a)
 
Auto. 
F 
GINI 0.802    33 0.026 2.028 4.179 1.712 3.28 
 (0.899)      [0.166] [0.124] [0.199] [0.08]* 
GINI  0.125   33 0.040 3.267 2.149 2.119 2.71 
  (0.112)     [0.082] [0.342] [0.139] [0.11] 
GINI   -0.463  33 0.024 1.839 3.684 1.627 3.26 
   (0.534)    [0.186] [0.159] [0.215] [0.08]* 
GINI    0.139 33 0.000 2.053 4.477 0.631 3.39 
    (1.281)   [0.163] [0.107] [0.539] [0.08]* 
*, **, *** denote significant at the 90%, 95% and the 99% level, respectively. Standard Errors are given in 
parentheses; probabilities for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity of errors test-stat F, the 
normality of errors test-stat χ2 and the heteroskedasticity of errors test-stat F are given in square brackets. 
(a)
  
is the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test. Probabilities are given in brackets. 
 
 
Using the RALS estimators to analyze the relationship between GINI and both measures 
of democracy, GASTIL and POLITY2, we found that both measures are insignificant. 
Both GASTIL and POLITY2 have a positive sign which are theoretically implausible, 
because the theory predicts that a higher level of democratization leads to lower level of 
income inequality. A low Partial R
2 
precludes any relationship between democracy and 
GINI. The diagnostic tests do not reject the validity of the specification of the model. 
POL-RIGHTS and CIVIL-LIB are found insignificant. POL-RIGHT has a theoretically 
plausible negative sign, but CIVIL-LIB has positive sign.  
5. Conclusions 
Using the instrumental variables estimator, one measure of democracy GASTIL was 
found to have significant and theoretically plausible inverse relationship with expenditure 
variable. We observed that the POL-RIGHTS had a significant negative impact on 
expenditures perhaps suggesting that with an increase in political rights, the governing 
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institutions begin to feel themselves more accountable and as such are more circumspect 
in expenditures. GASTIL and POLITY2 as well as POL-RIGHTS have a positive effect 
on the government expenditures on community, social and public services (CSPS) 
indicating that the democracy is a better form of political dispensation where the 
guarding the public interests are concerned. 
Our research therefore partly corroborates the Olson‟s theory that with less democracy, 
the expenditure is expected to increase because the aim of an autocratic regime is to 
channel highest possible amount of resources towards displaying a military might as well 
as expenditure on other ostentatious consumptions.  
It has been shown that there is no significant impact of democracy on the fiscal policy 
variables like expenditure, revenues and deficit. Similarly, the non-existent relationship 
between democracy and social expenditure (the relationship between the democracy and 
its various components and the community, social and public services has been proved 
insignificant in our benchmark model) is quizzical. Why should it be so raises more 
questions than answers? Is the weakness of the democratic institutions over the years 
responsible for the near absence of any relationship between the various definitions of 
democracy and fiscal policy variables? Or is that the alternating democratic and non-
democratic regimes have not been much different in their policy formulations and policy 
implementations? Further research is required to offer insights into this enigmatic 
situation.  
An important issue in this research is that even though both measures of democracy 
GASTIL and POLITY2 show inverse and only weakly significant impact on income 
inequality (significant at 90%) when we used instrumental variables estimator, even this 
tenuous relationship was found to be absent in our benchmark model using RALS 
estimation method.  A great deal of research has to be focused on the mechanisms lying 
behind the relationship between democracy and inequality, and more importantly what is 
the cause of inequality. One of many possible reasons for this insignificant relationship 
may be that the democratic institutions have not been given the opportunity to take firm 
roots in Pakistan since independence, the result of which is that the brief interludes of 
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democracy saw politicians fighting their own pitched battles instead of making sincere 
and concerted efforts aimed at reducing inequality and promoting growth.  
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